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ABSTRACT. When ethical dilemmas of responsibility and conviction seem to involve any human fabric 
of the real world, Sophie’s Choice (1982) is guided by an ethic of responsibility of one end would justify the 
means and she did not have the option to dodge out. Through an observational study of qualitative 
approach we aim to situate the dilemma suffered by the protagonist of the film within ethical parameters 
defined by Max Weber when he explains the ethics of responsibility and the conviction ethic. The 
contributions of this study go beyond the fictional and cinematic limits of Sophie’s Choice to a time 
depicting ethical dilemmas that may be suffered by people in the real world and (unwanted) choices 
reflecting further consequences beyond the end of justifications and axiological assumptions. Thus many 
other hodiernal historical contexts are diverse, that even in different political, cultural, economic and social 
conditions, people find themselves forced to make choices that are not intended. This widens the scope of 
the film and brings the contemporary debate that remains current. 
Keywords: ethical dilemmas; responsibility ethic; conviction ethic; Sophie’s Choice; filmic language. 
Estudo observacional sob a ética weberiana no filme A Escolha de Sofia 
RESUMO. Quando dilemas éticos de responsabilidade ou convicção parecem envolver qualquer trama 
humana de mundo real, a Escolha de Sofia (1982) guia-se por uma ética da responsabilidade de um fim que 
justificaria o meio que ele não teve a opção de esquivar-se. Por meio de um estudo observacional de 
abordagem qualitativa objetiva-se situar o dilema sofrido pela protagonista do filme dentro dos parâmetros 
éticos determinados por Max Weber quando explica a ética de responsabilidade e a ética de convicção. As 
contribuições deste estudo extrapolam os limites fictícios e cinematográficos da escolha de Sofia ao tempo 
que retratam dilemas éticos que podem ser sofridos por pessoas do mundo real e escolhas (não desejadas) 
que refletem consequências posteriores além das justificativas de fim e de pressupostos axiológicos. Deste 
modo são diversos outros contextos históricos hodiernos que, mesmo em diferentes condições políticas, 
culturais, econômicas e sociais, pessoas se veem obrigadas às escolhas que não pretendem fazer. Isto amplia 
o escopo do filme e traz à contemporaneidade um debate que permanece atual. 
Palavras chave: dilemas éticos; ética de responsabilidade; ética de convicção; A Escolha de Sofia; linguagem fílmica. 
Introduction 
Human history is permeated by large and deep 
discussions that guide evolution of social, political, 
economic and behavior order. Among them, there 
are certain issues related to ethics and power, 
inherent to human thinking and living in society 
that were and still are large controversy generators 
throughout the centuries. 
The beginning of ethical thoughts first thoughts 
date back to ancient Greece, around the sixth 
century BC, when several social forces came to 
coexist (warrior aristocracy, villagers forces, eminent 
families, religious people etc.) and initiated the need 
for social order, permeated by moral reflections on 
the obligations and coexistence between classes. 
However, tradition, behavior, habits, the ‘moral’ or 
‘ethos’ already have existed for a long time, either 
through divine ethics, existing in religions; by taboos 
professed in ancient tribes; being it based on 
reciprocity of good and bad practices, as was seen in 
the Code of Hammurabi (‘an eye for an eye, a tooth 
for a tooth’); or simply human intuition. Such 
reflections were discussed and developed by various 
scholars and philosophers, such as Platão, Aristotle, 
Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Voltaire, Kant, among 
others (Stukart, 2003; Souza, 2007). 
Until the Middle Ages, generally, the concepts of 
moral and ethics started getting confused, especially 
by the fact that both words have similar roots, since 
they deal with conduct considered mandatory (La 
Taille, 2006). 
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According to Chauí (2009), the confusion 
between ethics and moral can be explained 
etymologically, since moral word comes from the 
Latin, mores, and the word ethics comes from the 
Greek ethos, both meaning customs. However, the 
Greek word ethos can be written with a short vowel, 
epsilon, meaning natural character, temperament, or 
the long vowel, eta, meaning customs. 
Officially, procedures of conduct considered 
more suited in this or that society are understood as 
moral, as ethics relates directly to the philosophy 
that studies the nature of human beings whose 
actions are founded on the reason, considering 
moral values and ideal principles of human conduct 
(Michaelis, 2013). However, according to La Taille 
(2006), several authors still disagree with the 
concepts and their differences. 
Among the ancient philosophers, for example, 
Platão (2005) taught in his first positions, that ethics 
was oriented for and by the good. For Aristotle 
(1973), the main purpose of ethics was the search for 
the real cause of human existence, namely the 
pursuit of the good and happiness, only achieved by 
the soul and when that execute actions that would 
enable its fulfillment. 
With regard to modern philosophers, Kant 
(2005) associated moral with human egocentrism, 
stating that, in general, self-esteem only happens 
when the self-respect of a person focuses on the 
existing moral values, that is, when it passes in the 
pre-social judgment. Mill (1986), in turn, argued 
that ethics must necessarily harmonize with 
individual liberty, being actions that guide to human 
happiness the basic principle for morality and ethics. 
To La Taille (2006), morality derives from a sense of 
obligation, while ethics is the expansion of the 
individual. 
Weber (2002), whose study of ethics is the focus 
of this work, lectured on ethics in political affairs, 
dividing it into two parts: the ethic of responsibility 
and ethics of conviction. The ethic of responsibility 
is guided by the purposes; as the conviction of ethics 
is guided by the values of the individual. Weber's 
work (2002) is widely used in the legal environment 
to streamline judicial decisions, which, in theory, 
seek a balance between the two Weberian ethics 
enhancing the understanding of the facts and the 
sense of justice (Costa, 2009). 
Therefore, considering that ethics is indelibly 
embedded in the human character, aggravated by 
moral, Ullmann-Margalit (2007) states that it is 
fateful that everyone faces a choice that will lead 
them to a deeper ethical reflection, influenced by the 
social and moral rules that were submitted for life, 
or to a situation that presents a challenge of 
incalculable choice because of certain characteristics 
of their own choice or scenario that the person is 
facing. 
Thus, a film that could exemplify an ethical 
dilemma faced according to Weber's ethics on the 
topic was identified: Sophie's Choice. The objective of 
this article is to situate the dilemma suffered by the 
protagonist of the film within ethical parameters 
defined by Max Weber, through an observational 
study. It is emphasized that this film is constantly 
referenced in several areas, especially in the social 
and legal sciences, to exemplify great ethical 
dilemmas or justify controversial decisions (Maslin, 
1982). 
This study is important to discuss a relevant and 
current issue for society as a whole, through a 
playful deception of greater spreading power, which 
is the filmic language. In addition, relevance is 
emphasized by strengthening observational studies 
in the academic community, which is already 
recognizing the value of this type of technique. 
Moral and ethical relativism in the history of mankind 
The words and the concepts of ethics and morals 
are frequently used in everyday life of people in the 
media, in publications, in many ways. This 
exacerbated use is called by Romano (2001, p. 94) a 
“[...] violent inflation of the term [...]” considering 
that when the public and the experts talk too much, 
these elements are certainly being conveyed 
uncritically. At the same time, they are very 
important concepts for the design of society, 
overflows of questionable practices are often 
perceived and they could be the inverse of morals 
and ethics in the history of humanity, causing it to 
fall into a chronic nihilism of these values (Romano, 
2001). 
On the other hand, even if their importance is 
understood, are they absolute and irrefutable values? 
Silva (2007, p. 109) points out the impossibility of 
building a moral from which one could make out 
the absolute good, considering that no moral 
behavior - and why not ethical - is eternal, but “[...] 
subject to contingencies of a country or a people”. 
That is, the author relativizes customs, considering 
the cultural idiosyncrasies of each people, each 
nation. Silva (2007, p. 109) further says that “[...] the 
right to act is defined by respect for the customs of 
each people and the improvement of common sense 
and the virtue of moderation”. 
Knowledge of history and nations is important 
not only to assess continuities and transformations, 
as well, if the customs remain or are transformed 
into liberal or conservative perspectives in order to 
deliver this knowledge to support discussions and 
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analyzes on moral relativity and the necessary critical 
vision to judge it (Silva, 2014). It is clear, therefore, 
that the relativity of morality is discussed openly. 
Tugendhat (1998, p. 49) stated that “[...] the concept 
of morals that would not allow maintaining the 
possibility of a plurality of moral conceptions is now 
unacceptable”. 
According to La Taille (2010), there are two 
types of moral relativism: the axiological and 
anthropological. The axiological relativism, 
according to this author, implies thinking that any 
and all moral values assumed by different cultures or 
people (and the rules of conduct arising) are 
equivalent, and it is impossible to establish a 
hierarchy between them or consider some as 
immoral. La Taille (2010) even gives as an example 
of axiological relativism the case of an individual 
who although does not practice genital excision in 
girls himself, considers valid that some people do so 
in the name of religious precepts, i.e., tolerance is 
maximum with the differences. On the other hand, 
according to the author, how can anyone that really 
believes that maim is morally wrong accepts, 
without problems of conscience, that people are 
maimed in many parts of the world? They would 
miss experimenting the feeling of indignation, 
inseparable from the sense of obligation (La Taille, 
2010). 
The anthropological relativism, in turn: 
[...] does not consist in saying that all moral choices 
are worth but that, in fact, they exist. For example, 
here, to kill the wicked is forbidden, and there it is a 
duty; here, having sex outside marriage is allowed, 
and there it is strictly prohibited etc. [...] If we 
analyze the various known moral systems, we find 
that the virtues of justice and benevolence are always 
present. But the fact is that this presence receives 
very different and even contradictory interpretations. 
Islamist terrorists kill in the name of (divine) justice; 
human rights activists condemn the death penalty, 
also in the name of justice. In short, it appears that, 
in fact, the moral level can be occupied by a variety 
of content (La Taille, 2010, p. 107). 
Finally, it is important to emphasize the 
profound link between the concepts of morality and 
ethics, to the point they start to merge in certain 
discussions. For La Taille (2010), both are linked to 
the alleged duties of persons: ethics usually related 
to public order duties; and the moral related to the 
intrinsic duties of the role played by the person in a 
given social context. Thus, it is believed that 
thinking about the moral motivation through the 
ethical choices allows greater flexibility to account 
for the variety of behaviors that are observed (La 
Taille, 2010). 
But ethics does not create morality. While it is 
true that all moral assumes certain principles, 
standards or rules of behavior, it is not ethics that 
establishes a particular community (Vásquez, 1995). 
On the liability of human decisions, Vásquez (1995, 
p. 2) states that: 
It is possible to speak of moral behavior only when 
the person who behaves that way is responsible for 
his/her acts, but this, in turn, involves the 
assumption s/he could do what s/he wanted to do, 
namely, that s/he could choose between two or more 
alternatives, and act according to the decision. The 
problem of free will, because of this, is inseparable 
from responsibility. Decide and act in a particular 
case is a practical-moral problem; but to investigate 
the way in which the moral responsibility relates to 
the freedom and determinism to which our actions 
are subject is a theoretical problem, the study of 
which is a matter of ethics. 
The problem we see is that, now and throughout 
history, many times individuals have found 
themselves in situations where they had to make 
decisions that they did not choose to take, but they 
had to do. 
Theoretical reflections on weberian ethics 
Max Weber stands out today as one of the most 
prominent philosophers of modern sociology, 
presenting new perspectives with regard to politics 
and power (Marsal, [s.d.]). Also, according to 
Marsal ([s.d.]), Weber was an author dazzled by 
political power or even all forms of domination. 
Thus, his studies and his positions influenced the 
most varied areas, such as economics, management, 
medicine, law, among others. 
In politics harvest, Weber (2002) discusses the 
legitimacy of state power, which happens through 
the recognition of the old; the charismatic domain 
of who occupy positions of power; and the 
obedience of faith to the laws imposed by society. In 
relation to this obedience, Weber (2002, p. 62) 
believes that “[...] modern state is a grouping of 
domination that has institutional character and who 
sought (successfully) to monopolize, within the 
limits of a territory, the legitimate physical violence 
as instrument of domination”. The legitimacy word 
pervades Weber's studies (1991, 2002) on 
domination, ie the efficiency of domination lies in 
legitimation by the dominated. 
Analyzing the legitimate physical violence, 
Arendt (1999) warns of guilt and individual 
responsibility in the modern bureaucratic state, 
coining the phrase ‘the banality of evil’ from the 
Adolf Eichmann’s Trial in Jerusalem in 1961. 
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It is seen that the concept of morality, appointed 
by La Taille (2006), can be seen in the work of 
Weber (2002), who even says that the political values 
go beyond the ethical values, which, in turn, took 
larger dimensions, requiring greater specialization 
according to the area in which they apply. Today we 
see, for example, ethical precepts very specialized in 
the legal and medical fields (Teixeira, 1999). 
One of the greatest contributions of Weber 
(2002) was the informative discussion of ethics in 
the light of human rationality. The author said that 
it is an inherent human need to justify their actions 
to at least their own conscience, whether their cause 
is noble or not, rationalizing their decisions and 
looking for peace of mind and maintaining their 
understanding of honor and dignity (Weber, 2002). 
Thus, ethics for all is difficult to implement, 
especially in politics because, on all sides, there will 
be those who defend what belongs to them, with 
their own understanding of ethics. 
Weber (2002, p. 114) distinguishes ethics in two 
clear strands of social action, “[...] entirely different 
and irreducibly opposing”: the ethics of conviction 
and the ethics of responsibility. It can be considered 
that the ethics of conviction, corresponding to the 
Kantian categorical imperative, since it emphasizes 
the relationship between moral norms and values, 
while the ethics of responsibility corresponds to the 
hypothetical imperative, emphasizing the 
relationship between means and ends. 
Relating with two types of social action proposed 
by Weber (1991), the ethics of responsibility is based 
on rational social action-oriented purposes, while 
the ethics of conviction has its base solidly planted 
on rational social action guided by values. 
In terms of clarification, social action, as every 
action can be: 
[...] 1) rationally determined related to the purpose: 
by expectations about the behavior of the outside 
world objects and other people, using these 
expectations as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ to achieve 
their own purposes, rationally weighted and 
pursued. 
2) rationally determined related to values: by the 
conscious belief in the value - ethical, aesthetic, 
religious or whatever your interpretation is - 
absolute and inherent to certain behavior, regardless 
of the outcome (Weber, 1991, p. 15, grifos do autor). 
Action and behavior have different concepts, 
because in action there is a sense given by the agent 
itself. Thus, to Weber (1991, p. 15-16) 
Acts rationally related to the purposes the one who 
guides his/her action by the purposes, means and 
secondary consequences, both rationally pondering 
the means with regard to secondary consequences, 
as well as the different possible endings to each 
other. 
[...] Acts in a purely rational way referring to 
amounts the one who, regardless of the foreseeable 
consequences, acts in the service of his/her 
conviction on what appears to order him/her a duty, 
dignity, beauty, religious policies, pity or the 
importance of a cause of any kind. 
Thus, the ethics of conviction presupposes a 
reality where human duties never conflict and values 
are ordered hierarchically. In that ethics, the 
responsibility of the agent begins and ends with 
obedience to claims or lawsuits, according to the 
order of things, and its intention to comply is the 
most important indicator of moral worthiness. It is 
an ethic guided by the values and feelings of the 
individual, in its pure and simple belief that simply 
should or should not act a certain way or make 
certain choices. Thus, it is understood that the man 
who is only guided by the ethics of conviction, 
disclaims responsibility for the consequences 
because he did the ‘right thing’ (Starr, 1999; Weber, 
2002; Costa, 2009). 
The ethics of responsibility, on the other hand, is 
the formulation of an appropriate policy stance in 
the face of a serious moral challenge in a world 
characterized by inevitable and insoluble value 
conflicts. Thus, the ethics of responsibility is guided 
by the purposes that justify the means, being it the 
ethics of the man of action: analytical. Here, man 
must worry about efficiency, making the best choice 
within what is exposed, assuming the potential 
losses for the greater good, ie taking responsibility of 
the consequences of their actions (Starr, 1999; 
Weber, 2002; Costa, 2009). 
Aron (2000, p. 470-472) states that 
The ethics of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik) is 
one that the man of action is bound to adopt; it 
orders to be placed in a position to foresee the 
consequences of their possible decisions and is 
seeking to introduce an act that will achieve certain 
results or determine certain consequences we want 
to the plot of events. The ethics of responsibility 
interprets the action in terms of means-ends [...], it 
is concerned with efficiency, and it is defined by the 
choice of means adjusted to the end that it is 
intended. [...] The problem of the choice of values 
introduces us to the ethics of conviction 
(Gesinnungsethik) that urges to act according to our 
feelings, without reference, explicit or implied, to 
the consequences. 
Although Weber (2002) has stated that both 
ethics are opposed and different, he opposes making 
it clear that they do not cancel each other, and either 
do not complement each other. They coexist in 
society and the balance between the two is the life of 
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man, which sometimes will come across paradoxes 
between the two ethics and even with his/her 
convictions, he/she has to take responsibility for 
his/her actions, because the loss will be tremendous; 
or take decisions based on convictions, when they 
are expected to take losses on the way. 
It is important to make clear that the two ethics 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, that is, the 
ethic of responsibility is not the complete absence of 
conviction and the ethic of conviction is not lack of 
responsibility (Weber, 2002). 
Methods 
Given its relevance, ethical dilemmas have been 
addressed frequently not only in literature but also 
in other media, such as film. Currently, it is 
understood that cinema can also be an important 
source of knowledge, for through it, it is possible to 
relate to the reality of the viewers with the most 
different theoretical and philosophical sources, 
disseminating them in a more playful way for people 
and becoming an effective teaching tool, because of 
the huge coverage of this media in a globalized 
world (Fernandes, 2007; Matos, Lima, & Giesbrecht, 
2011; Mesquita, Sousa, Martins, & Matos, 2014). In 
this case, it is believed that the ethical dimensions 
presented by Weber (2002) may also be 
disseminated in a facilitated way through an 
observational study of a film on the subject. 
This research has descriptive qualitative 
character, using indirect structured non-behavioral 
observational method (Cooper & Schindler, 2003; 
Mesquita & Matos, 2014). According to the authors, 
the observational method is ideal for analyzing 
aesthetic features such as paintings, recordings and, 
in this case, motion pictures, because data collection 
method comprises the subjective parameters 
contained in this media, such as colors, sounds, 
settings etc. Moreover, indirect observational study, 
according to Cooper and Schindler (2003), is 
beneficial to produce a less biased observation over a 
direct observation. The authors cited stress that 
many academics still have a bias towards the 
observational method, considering it limited and 
ignoring the potential of observations for in-depth 
studies. 
At first, secondary data collection was performed 
such as annals, scientific journals and books, with 
special focus on the work ‘Science and Politics - 
Two Vocations’ by Weber (2002), which details the 
two types of ethics addressed in this work: 
responsibility and conviction. The next moment, it 
was sought to identify, through an observational 
study, the principles of Weber with regard to both 
ethics that can be identified in the movie Sophie’s 
Choice (Pakula, 1982). Therefore, the 
cinematographic work was watched five times by the 
authors: the first for knowledge of the work and the 
subsequent one to further analysis about the film, 
trying to observe not only references to Weber in the 
plot, but also in other compositions of the film, as 
photography, direction, art, lighting, sound, etc., in 
close observation with analysis described in the 
following section. 
The observational study 
Sophie’s Choice is based on the eponymous best-
selling novel by William Styron, published in 1979, 
which ranked 47 weeks in the lists of The New York 
Times and won the National Book Award in 1980. The 
film also had great impact in the film society, 
receiving several awards for the exemplary 
interpretation of Meryl Streep, as the protagonist 
Sofia Zawistowski. 
The film begins with the arrival of Stingo, 22 
year-old from the south to New York, intending to 
fulfill his dream of becoming a writer. With little 
money, he manages to rent a room in a pink-colored 
house that hides dark personal tragedies of its guests 
Sophie Zawistowski, Polish Catholic survivor of the 
Auschwitz concentration camp and Nathan Landau, 
an American Jew. 
When he helps Sophie after fainting in a library 
and takes her to the pink house, Nathan sees on her 
arm a tattoo of the concentration camp and the scars 
from cuts on both wrists. Sofia confirms she was in 
a camp, but says she does not want to talk about it. 
Newcomer in the house, Stingo witnesses an 
argument between Sofia and Nathan, who says, after 
several verbal abuses, ‘Sophie, we are dying’. The 
scene and the phrase impress Stingo, who is 
surprised to find the two together after hours, acting 
as if nothing had happened. 
Because he is a writer and his room is just below 
Nathan and Sophie's bedroom, Stingo questions if 
the noise of the typewriter bothers them. She says 
no, that it makes her feel safe because it remembers 
her father, who was a professor at the University of 
Krakow and she used to type his speeches in the 
evenings. She says that her father was a defender of 
the Jews, who sought to protect them from the 
Germans and that, therefore, was killed by the 
Nazis. 
The three become inseparable friends. Nathan is 
a Jewish worship, which dominates different 
subjects and, as a paranoid schizophrenic, believes 
he is Pfizer lab biologist involved in a major survey, 
whose results can take him to win a Nobel Prize. 
Sophie is a sweet and sad woman, deeply involved 
with Nathan, who practically saved her life when 
she arrived in the United States. 
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The three live in a fragile balance that mood 
swings and sudden aggressive behavior by Nathan 
breaks with some frequency. Sophie never mentions 
her past as Nathan in his crises in blames her for 
being alive when six million Jews were killed. 
After a big argument, Nathan and Sophie no 
longer live in the pink house and Stingo looks for 
information in the place where Sophie works. Her 
supervisor says she missed work and that it may be 
possible that Sonja, a Polish friend who works at the 
university, has some news. At the university, the 
language professor says Sonja returned to Poland, 
but he knows who Sophie is, professor Bieganski’s 
daughter. Stingo asks if he was his student and the 
professor says he saw only a lecture by Bieganski, 
and that it was enough. 
Stingo is surprised when the professor shows 
him a book that says that Sofia’s father was a radical 
anti-Semitic, propagator of the Bank Act, which 
prohibited Jewish students to sit on the same bench 
that Polish students sit, and that he was really killed 
by the Nazis, who one day came to university and 
killed all students, without asking their political 
positions. 
Disappointed with the situation and the lack of 
friends, Stingo decides to return to the South, when 
he hears the voice of Sophie. She bids farewell and 
he asks why the lie about her father. She says that 
out of fear, after so many lies she does not even 
know what is true, but she loved her father until the 
winter of 1938 when while typing his speech on 
'The Jewish problem in Poland' for the first time she 
identified the word Vernichtung - extermination. 
Under this impact, she stopped typing the 
speech and went to the ghetto. She could not 
understand why those people, men, women and 
children should be exterminated. She returned to 
finish the job and made many mistakes in the text, 
which caused intense anger in her father and her 
husband. 
Disgusted, she went to Warsaw, where she 
became Jozef’s lover who, along with his sister, was 
part of the Polish resistance. After showing some 
pictures of Polish children signed by the Germans, 
Jozef's sister asks Sophie to translate some 
documents stolen from Gestapo because she is 
fluent in German. Even being shocked upon 
learning about The Lebensborn Program – which 
separated children from their parents, took them to 
be raised as German, but exterminated them when 
they were considered racially inappropriate – she 
refused to translate it, citing fear for the safety of her 
children. 
Two weeks later, Jozef was murdered by the 
Nazis and then she was arrested with her sons, Jan 
and Eva, taken to the death camp of Auschwitz, 
where her son was referred to Kinderlogg, a 
children's camp and her daughter was referred to the 
crematorium II. Because she was fluent in German, 
she was assigned to work as a secretary for Rudolf 
Hoess, the camp commander in the period of 1940 
to 1943. 
In the Auschwitz camp it is possible to identify 
with shocking clarity “[...] a grouping of domination 
that has institutional character and that 
(successfully) sought to monopolize, within the 
limits of a territory, the legitimate physical violence 
as instrument of domination” (Weber, 2002, p. 62). 
Domination and legitimacy are words that go 
together in Weber's text, but in the death camps, 
although institutionalized by the Nazi state, 
domination is not legitimized by its victims. Physical 
violence is extreme and lethal, although ethically, 
morally and humanly unjustified. 
In a dialogue with Hoess, another official says his 
father asked him what his medical function in 
Auschwitz was and he answers that he did the work 
of God: deciding between who should die and who 
should live. It can be observed that there is no ethics 
and no moral because it assumes the power of a 
deity to justify practical actions. 
In another discussion, Sophie is physically hurt 
by Nathan. Stingo tries to help her when they 
receive a calling by Nathan threatening to kill them 
and, before hanging up the phone, they hear the 
sound of a shot and new threat. The two flee and, 
upon arrival at a hotel, Stingo asks Sophie to move 
in with him on the farm of his parents. He says he 
always loved her, that he wants to marry her and that 
wants her to be the mother of his children. Sophie 
says that the Stingo’s children do not deserve to have 
her as mother and decides to tell the truth never 
told. 
At dawn, Stingo finds a Sophie farewell note 
stating that she will seek Nathan. The film's final 
shows the embraced bodies of Nathan and Sophie in 
their pink-colored walls room, dead after ingesting 
cyanide. The quote of the beginning of the film, 
'Sophie, we are dying', was prophetic. 
In the screening queue of Auschwitz camp, a 
Nazi officer is attracted by the beauty of Sophie, 
who takes the opportunity to say that she is not 
Jewish, she is Polish and Catholic, and she is there 
by mistake. With absolute contempt, the official says 
that for her not being Jewish, he will give her the 
privilege of choice and allow her to stay with one of 
the children. She despairs and says he cannot 
choose. After a brief discussion, he says that if she 
does not choose, he will send both to the 
crematorium. She insists she cannot pick and he 
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ordered a guard to take the two children. Sophie 
then, in utter despair, says that they take her little 
girl, who by then was in her arms.  
Sophia’s choice is a dilemma between the ethics 
of conviction and the ethic of responsibility. 
The ethics of conviction is aligned with the 
rational social action oriented values, acts in the 
service of her conviction about what appears to 
order her a duty, dignity, beauty, religious policies, 
pity or the importance of a cause of any kind 
(Weber, 1991). For this ethic, no mother delivers a 
child to certain death. There are no figures to justify 
or legitimize such action. If her decision was guided 
by the ethics of conviction, Sophie would not have 
made a choice, because by this, the individual acts 
according to his/her feelings, without reference, 
express or implied, to the consequences (Aron, 
2000). 
The ethic of responsibility is based on the 
rational social action-oriented purposes, that is, 
behavior is guided by the purposes, means and 
secondary consequences (Weber, 1991). Guided by 
the ethics of responsibility, Sophie could not fail to 
choose, because she would have the opportunity to 
let one of the children live. The ethical 
responsibility is guided by the purposes that justify 
the means (Starr, 1999; Weber, 2002), ie leave a 
child alive (ends) justifies to choose another one to 
die (means). 
The justification of the means for the end, 
characteristic of ethics of responsibility, is in 
opposition to ethics of conviction because this 
condemns any actions that do appeal to morally 
dangerous means (Weber, 2002). For Vásquez 
(1995), one can only speak about moral behavior 
when the person who does the action is responsible 
for his/her actions, that is, s/he did that because s/he 
wanted to do, s/he can choose. Forced to choose, 
Sofia cannot be held responsible because she did not 
want to do it. The choice of the choice was not of 
her order, but an obligation. 
Before the axiological relativism, which shows 
that it is impossible to establish a hierarchy of values 
or consider some as immoral (La Taille, 2010), in 
Western civilization which culture would consider a 
mother choose a child to be killed moral? 
Conclusion 
Forcing a mother to choose one child for death is 
a torture without qualification, practiced as fun and 
as if a kind of divine power had been delegated to 
the Nazis. It was in this historical context that 
Sophie was forced to transform her perspectives. 
Before that, she would never choose one of her 
children over another, but given the situation of 
cruelty and brutality imposed by the Nazis, she was 
forced to that. 
Guilt and grief for her decision followed her 
after the end of the war, crossed the Atlantic Ocean 
and destroyed any possibility of happiness for 
Sophie. The stormy relationship with Nathan was 
the chosen path to her own destruction. Victims of 
Auschwitz took their suffering with them to the way 
they have chosen to tread. 
Although Sophie has chosen the life of one of 
her children, she did not ‘choose to choose’. That is, 
Sophie cannot be accused either ethically or morally 
because of her choice, simply because she had no 
choice. That’s the dilemma. Thus, many other 
hodiernal historical contexts are diverse, ones that 
even in different political, cultural, economic and 
social conditions, people find themselves forced to 
make choices that are not intended. This widens the 
scope of the film and brings the contemporary 
debate that remains current. 
The contributions of this study go beyond the 
fictional and cinematic limits of Sophie’s choice, as 
well as it depicts ethical dilemmas that may be 
suffered by people in the real world and (unwanted) 
choices reflecting further consequences beyond the 
end of justifications and axiological assumptions. 
The ethics of responsibility and conviction, as 
Weber (2002) says, should guide human decisions in 
unity, balancing their choices and those that the 
institutions impose by mechanisms of domination. 
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